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In other words:
Towards a poetic theology of the spoken 
Word of God
Jacob Rollison
Mais le Fils de l’homme n’a pas où reposer sa tête
le monde des calculs ignore cette place
Inutile aux profits de la vaste conquête
qu’est un homme quand on organise l’Espace?1
I have heard it said that if prose is a window, poetry is stained glass: 
prose offers a view to what is beyond, while in poetry, the glass itself 
is presented. If we are to accept the thrust of this metaphor, what is at 
stake in the difference between poetry and prose is twofold: first, it is 
a question of the relation of form to content. Prose operates with an 
assumed separability between the two: one could say the same thing 
in different words. This very separability is its separation from poetry. 
Second, by the same characteristic, poetry raises the question of the 
relation of the word to a ‘beyond’, to some other thing, and to itself 
– which we might summarize (in oversimplifying, to be sure) as the 
question of representation versus presence. Prose, ‘in other words’, 
might be more or less beautiful, descriptive, or evocative of the 
content which it conveys; poetry, ‘in other words’, is no longer itself.
Christian theology is a discipline of the word which has special 
reasons for taking words seriously. The Judeo-Christian God is first 
and foremost the God who speaks, and whose speech creates. For the 
Christian, Jesus Christ is the Word of God, and this Word is God. The 
questions, then, which poetry poses to theology are: is Jesus Christ 
as the Word prosaic or poetic? Is the content of God’s revelation 
separable from, or does it extend beyond, its form? Is theology a 
discourse of representation, or of presence?
To probe these questions, which I believe are not only relevant 
but central for theological reflection today, I will draw on the French 
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theologian, sociologist and (possibly the least-known occupation of 
this semi-obscure thinker) poet Jacques Ellul. I have the sense that 
the relevance of Ellul’s work for theology is only beginning to be 
more widely explored and recognized.2 Questions of the form and 
content of theological language and themes of presence were central 
to his entire oeuvre, making him an excellent dialogue partner in 
this respect. In using Ellul to probe poetic questions of theology, 
we find that the question of poetry is also the question of theology’s 
relation to philosophy. Specifically, Ellul offered an early critical 
engagement with and response to the philosophical movements of 
post-structuralism and postmodernism in France in the 1960s–80s, 
which I believe remain central philosophical dialogue partners for 
Christian theology today: thus, the relevance of Ellul’s reflections on 
poetry are worthy of consideration today.3
Ellul: poetry and presence
Poetry, for Ellul, is neither a simple style nor an embellishment, 
but exactly this inseparability between the form and content of 
communication. In his 1987 existential mediation on the book of 
Ecclesiastes, Reason for Being, Ellul describes Qohelet as a both 
a poet and an anti-philosopher. Viewing Qohelet as aware of and 
incorporating Greek philosophy to ironically subvert it, Ellul sees 
Qohelet’s orientation to death, finitude, and God as mapping the 
coordinates for His poetic wisdom:
The poet, then, is not a person who thinks and has a nice style. 
He has the word of his thought, which cannot be expressed 
otherwise. [...] There is not a philosophical, skeptical, or 
pragmatic thought, and then a sort of heavy or baroque style… 
There is a spark of genius, overturning all norms, creating a 
language for itself at the same time that a rugged, harsh, and 
total questioning springs up, pitiless. This is a truly a poiein 
– a creation. […] And this is why all of his translators have 
finally delivered a beautiful, harmonious text. They produce 
a poetic text because the original is poetic, and its language is 
beautiful, in spite of its laxity and grammar. The poetry comes 
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from the language’s being forged directly by the difficulty of 
the question in view.4
In Ellul’s 1975 treatment of the book of Revelation, Apocalypse: 
The Book of Revelation, he likewise elaborates: ‘It is an error of 
method in a book such as this to dissociate meaning and form: the 
latter is a servant, as in all poems, to explicate, illustrate, the meaning 
of the message.’5
Ellul’s reading of Qohelet as an ironic anti-philosopher is heavily 
influenced by his reading of Kierkegaard. The same book contains 
many appropriations of Kierkegaardian themes. Ellul draws on 
Kierkegaard’s idea of Christianity as an ‘existence-communication’, 
suggesting that the poetic inseparability of form and content in divine 
revelation means that it is a serious mutation to translate the historical 
event of Jesus Christ’s life on earth into philosophical categories; to 
change its form from an historical event would be to treat it prosaically, 
‘in other words’. This implies a need for great care in the formal 
movement from an event to a doctrine. At minimum, the theologian 
should recognize the shift in grammar which takes place in this 
movement; at most, the theologian must ask if this move is possible 
without betraying its content. Thus, while Ellul was also heavily 
influenced by Karl Barth, he ultimately had trouble with Barth’s grand 
systematic project in the Church Dogmatics, privileging Kierkegaard 
instead.6 The same epistemological problems apply to attempts at 
systematic theological construction: either we are describing the 
world which we inhabit, in which case we cannot impose a principle 
of non-contradiction (the ‘systematizing’ move) without taking the 
place of God – ‘Existence itself is a system – for God’7 – or we are 
able to do so, but we have situated ourselves outside of the world we 
are describing, in which case it is no longer the world we inhabit.8 
This is not, therefore, an obscure and impractical debate: the treatment 
of the world hinges on the question of poetic or prosaic grammar in 
theology.
However, Ellul also inverts this direction, reading Kierkegaard via 
Qohelet. A central theme in Kierkegaard’s edifying discourses is the 
need for the believer to become ‘contemporary with Christ.’ I argue 
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that Ellul finds the roots of his focus on presence in Kierkegaard’s 
contemporaneity, and that Ellul’s presence includes three components 
which were decisive in Kierkegaard. First, both thinkers emphasize the 
need of the theologian to think within the limits of time and space; this 
is to accept her status as a creature. Second, both emphasize that the 
believer is addressed in this present dialogue with God, and is called 
to respond freely; over time, this is a process of existential becoming. 
And third, both thinkers emphasize the aspect of the presence of God, 
God’s presence in the work which He effects by His Word. Reading 
Kierkegaard via Qohelet leads Ellul to two major departures from 
Kierkegaard’s thought: first, Ellul’s work lacks Kierkegaard’s rhetoric, 
his Socratic, pseudonymic irony (though it retains a more serious 
irony of its own). Most powerfully in his 1981 The Humiliation of the 
Word, Ellul views the word as inseparable from the life of the one who 
speaks it – only this connection to life gives the human word its force 
and meaning. Ellul thus does not take up the ‘aesthetic’ pseudonymous 
style of Kierkegaard, which would allow him to take an ironic distance 
from portions of his work.9 And second, Kierkegaard’s protest against 
Hegelian abstraction notwithstanding, Ellul’s work lacks precisely the 
dimension of fixity and abstraction which made Kierkegaard’s work 
fodder for the creation of existentialism as a philosophy.10
Thus, to the question of the poetic or the prosaic word, Ellul’s 
answer, informed by his unique reading of Kierkegaard and Qohelet 
on presence, affirms the inseparability of form and content in theology 
and thus affirms the presence of God in His revelation. Or, more 
precisely: Ellul acknowledges the freedom of the theologian to make 
this separation if they so choose: 
[…] I take for granted that it is indeed possible to restate the 
revelation without losing it. I assume that one can find images 
and concepts which fit the situation of modern man, and that 
the latter stands in need of these, none of which is obvious.
Prosaic separation is possible, perhaps even necessary; Ellul does 
this in his The Ethics of Freedom by trying to express sin in terms 
of Marxist alienation. But the prosaic separation is seriously limited: 
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Here we come upon a limit to hermeneutics. It can restate the 
truth spoken by God in terms accessible to modern man. It can 
neither render that truth more genuine and so make it easier 
to win a man over, nor make it capable of producing tangible 
results in a person’s life. […] the operation balances out with 
a deficit of faith.11 
Thus, we are free to take theology prosaically, but must admit that 
the poetry of faith is compromised. Ellul’s poetic focus thus takes the 
content and form of words seriously, emphasizing their freedom to live 
in the temporal present, and leaving space for the faith of the listener. 
The implications of this answer mark clearly Ellul’s differences with 
the philosophical movements of his age, and are visible in the relation 
between speech, creation, prayer, and history.
Speaking the world
The long quotation from Reason for Being given on pages 64–65 draws 
out the connection between poetry and creation. When God speaks, 
the world lives and moves; God’s spoken Word is understandable as 
the form of which the world is the content. In thus combining speech, 
creation, and movement, Ellul views all of creation as ‘structured’ by 
the speech of God. I put ‘structured’ in quotations because of Ellul’s 
hesitance to use this word, and his opposition to its dominance in 
late twentieth-century French thought, from Lévi-Strauss to Lacan, 
in post-structuralism and postmodernism in the 1960s–80s, and in 
the rise of hermeneutics as a discipline. In his 1972 Hope in Time 
of Abandonment, Ellul writes: ‘The obsession with communication 
blots out the substance of the message to be conveyed. We are indeed 
children of this age and of this world, dominated by a greater concern 
for form, medium, structure, and speech than for the thing said and for 
its content.’12
For Ellul, in addition to its inherent problematizing of the dimension 
of meaning, the problem with the language of ‘structure’ is that it is far 
too fixed: in other words, God speaks the world, which changes and 
becomes: to reduce speech to structure is to kill this movement.13 Or, 
more simply: unlike the post-structuralists, the world is God’s speech 
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for Ellul, and not a text, which has consequences for their respective 
views of presence and interpretation.
If the world is speech and not text, then poetic theology cannot be 
a metaphysical derivation: this would strip speech of its freedom. It 
is here that the presence/representation difference begins to operate in 
force: Christ is Immanuel, ‘God with us’, and not a mere representative. 
Christ is God’s Word, but the whole point being made is that God’s 
free will is expressed in the very Word He chooses; Christ is thus not 
reducible to metaphor.14 Even ontology becomes problematic because 
it would arrest the movement of life inherent in speech: Ellul specifies 
in The Humiliation of the Word that speech is inherently temporal, 
non-spatial, which means that ontology is too static a category to 
properly attend to speech as a phenomenon. ‘Phenomenology should 
not only cause things to appear as they are, but make them sound as 
they are! [...] The philosopher who refuses to listen also refuses both 
truth and reality. He lives within one set of categories and thinks with 
others.’15 Ellul’s poetic theology of speech, a theology where the form 
attends to the content, is thus to be distinguished from philosophy by 
its lack of fixity: poetry must be spoken.16
In context, this must be heard as an informed critique of post-
structuralism and postmodernism. Thinkers associated with these 
descriptions often criticize the Western philosophical tradition as early 
as Plato for privileging the word, for logocentrism. Jean-François 
Lyotard emphasized that in text, there are both ‘discursive’ and 
‘figural’ elements – in other words, text is speech made visible – and 
that the ‘figural’ was in the process of overtaking the discursive, which 
had formerly been the dominant element.17 Similarly, in his 1966 The 
Order of Things, Michel Foucault discussed speech in spatial terms, 
using words like ‘field’, ‘territory’, ‘horizon’. In doing so, he was 
changing the nature of spoken discourse in order to view it as an 
expression of a structure of power. Ellul agreed with Lyotard about 
this process of the figural overtaking the discursive, but cast it in more 
sociological terms, linking it to the rise of propaganda, the dominance 
of advertising and images, and the prevalence of audiovisual media, 
specifically from the late 1950s onwards.18 Ellul’s response to these 
philosophical movements, developed from the late 1960s and finding 
its culmination in The Humiliation of the Word, is that philosophy has 
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never fully attended to speech as speech at all; it has always already 
inscribed in space, whether metaphysical or textual. In other words, 
it has applied to the word exactly the principle of non-contradiction 
problematized above and ignored the inherently temporal and personal 
character of speech. Ellul’s theology thus aims to attend to the Word of 
God as poetic speech.19
Prayer, history, freedom: the poetica
Questioning the personal character of speech, of the full presence of 
the speaker, was central to Jacques Derrida’s critiques of an ‘onto-
theology of presence’; in attenuating the presence of the speaker, 
he emphasized the interpretative possibilities of the text of given 
communication. For Ellul, too, speech is presence; but unlike 
Derrida’s critiques of an ‘onto-theology of presence’, the grammar 
of Ellul’s presence is that of an existential wager, and neither a 
metaphysics nor an ontology. To restore the Kierkegaardian language 
behind Ellul’s thought, God’s presence is only available via a leap of 
faith; it is not a given, nor deducible from the state of the world. This 
is so first, because God’s freedom means that He cannot be reduced 
to a given a priori or a principle (necessitating, at least, great care in 
constructing a doctrine of God); and second, because God’s restricting 
Himself to His Word is His way of allowing for and respecting human 
freedom. This existential relation with God is the key to the meaning 
of prayer. In Ellul’s 1970 work Prayer and Modern Man, prayer is 
understandable as a dialogic relation with God only on the grounds 
of obedience to God’s command to pray; this command is to be taken 
by faith as God’s guarantee to accept the prayer as communication. In 
other words, prayer is the poetic form of Christian life, lived in faith 
in the presence of God, out of which the spoken discourse of human 
prayer can become meaningful. Thus, prayer marks the presence of 
God in the temporal present: ‘What would prayer be if it did not claim 
to make present, at this moment […] this meeting of God with man 
brought to pass in Jesus Christ?’20
The new crux of our poetry/prose question could be summarized 
as follows: if theology is not to accept philosophical frameworks for 
interpreting divine revelation, how should it proceed? In other words, 
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it is exactly the discernment of the eternal in the temporal which is 
at issue. We recall that Ellul rejects Kierkegaard’s ‘eternal’ as either 
too fixed or too abstract; if he is to refuse abstraction and try to think 
within the limits of time and space, how can he talk about the eternal 
God without positing a metaphysical or abstract eternity?
It is only via Ellul’s poetic reading (in the sense this essay has 
focused on: the inseparability of form and content) of the Apocalypse 
that he can say that the presence of Jesus Christ, accessible in prayer, 
allows human history to escape the play of determinisms which 
would otherwise enslave it. Ellul takes John’s Apocalypse as a highly 
complex and intentional communication by means of symbolism, 
trying exactly to express that which cannot be directly communicated:
We cannot seize upon these visions and symbols as if they 
were part of our present universe […] directly comprehensible 
and readable. We remain in the time between the times […] in 
the universe, where only the word conveys to us something on 
the part of God. […] In other words, we cannot comprehend 
vision as and symbols in themselves, by a direct reading.21
Ellul notes that it is in the interplay between ‘movement and 
structure’ that ‘the meaning is situated’.22 We do not have space here 
to recount Ellul’s view of this interplay; the decisive element is that 
the poetic nature of this communication is the only possible means to 
express what cannot be expressed by prosaic discourse. Ellul reads 
the book as ‘an allegory of God and His work, nothing more!’,23 one 
which reveals Jesus Christ as the recapitulation (Ellul insists on this 
word) of human history. If Christ is God’s poetic presence in history, 
rather than a key to a metahistorical system, then the Apocalypse 
becomes not the ‘prophetic’ prediction of future events, but the key to 
understanding the present as a relation with God, now, opening space 
for a future unfolding out of this God-human dialogue. The point is 
not the prediction of the future, but the redemption of time and the 
emancipation of the present. 
Recalling again Kierkegaard’s ‘existence-communication’, 
the specific form of the Apocalypse allows the comprehension of 
its content: ‘[…] if [John’s Apocalypse] employs language that is 
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mythical, or mystical, or full of imagery, it is to express something 
infinitely shifting, unknowable by a logical, rational discourse – 
something that cannot be known except in living it.’24 And Ellul’s 
attempt to describe this knowledge, naturally, ends in poetry. The two 
books of poetry which Ellul pens both refer to the Apocalypse. First, 
his 1994 book Silences, whose title is understandable via Apocalypse, 
where he explicates the triple meaning of silence as ‘crisis/end of 
time/presence of [the] all-powerful’; and second, more directly, in 
Oratorio: The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.25 In other words, 
for Ellul, only the poetry of the present God can enable theology to 
depart from representing an ideal and abstract truth, to find the Word 
of God as the truth, not solely intellectually or as a principle, but as it 
is revealed now, today, in the hic et nunc which we inhabit. 
Recapitulation
The implications of the question of poetry for theology are thus 
significant. If theology is not to be the analysis of a text, but a poetic 
listening and responding to the speech of God, how are we to proceed? 
Ellul’s response enacts a move which he views as both Kierkegaardian 
and Qoholetian – he attempts to restore theology to a discourse with 
its own contours, separate from (if still in dialogue with) philosophical 
thought. By reading revelation as poetry, Ellul can emphasize God’s 
presence with us, in our time and place. If one accepts this reading, it is 
not that metaphysical, ontological, or structural readings of revelation 
are wrong, per se – the theologian is still free. Rather, the fixity they 
offer can be heard as a prosaic stifling of the poetic dialogue of faith; 
it seems to me more correct to say they are forms which hinder rather 
than aid the communication of theological content. 
Our language of construction in theological discourse is 
significant in this respect: we are building thought structures, systems, 
architectures. If philosophy has always been a discourse of the city, 
then the proximity of theology to philosophy is measurable by the size 
of its towers. A prosaic, representative theology attempts to put God 
and the world into a model. But by aiming for theology as poetic, an 
existence communication, we want to build with living stones, not 
a fixed structure, but an architecture in movement.26 To take these 
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metaphors in their scriptural and Ellulian contexts means that the 
world and human history are contained in God’s poetic speech, and 
God’s poetry is thus not a text but a world; theology-as-poetry opens 
onto a world of poetic existence, and not just poetic ideas. The task 
of poetic theology, then, is not that of the architect or builder, the 
construction of a relation of propositions or ideas, but to facilitate a 
lived dialogue with the God who speaks the world, allowing one’s life 
to become one brick in a living architecture. As with G. K. Chesterton, 
theology-as-poetry means a trusting release of its drive to systematize, 
to model and order, to take up a free exploration in dialogue with a 
creator: ‘The poet only desires […] a world to stretch himself in. The 
poet only asks to get his head into the heavens. It is the logician who 
seeks to get the heavens into his head. And it is his head that splits.’27
The refusal of the form/content divide means that God is present in 
His poetry: Jesus Christ is both God’s Word and, thus, God. There is no 
separation or division between God’s love and God’s communication 
of His love in Jesus. Thus, to talk of ‘poetic’ theology means that we 
refuse to talk about God as if He were absent. It means reconciliation 
and not an abstract separation between God and the world He made. 
As offensive as it may seem in an era where the serious theologian 
drafts systematic metres of shelf-space and breaks her head over 
abstractions, the challenge poetry offers to theology is to put down its 
philosophical building blocks, to go outside and play, to become again 
the little children of God; and all the while, to retain the audacious 
knowledge that this outside which is not yet is already at the very 
interior of a truly eternal city of God. 
Suspendez vos regards, arrêtez vos cithares, 
souffle nouveau du temps qui parcourt l’éternel.28
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